An Experimental Analysis of Irish Electricity Auctions

Celine O'Donovan, Stephen Kinsella

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The authors study alternative auction design mechanisms in the delivery of electricity in Ireland, describe the institutional changes that have happened to the Irish electricity market since 2007, and design an experiment to test whether the current market design results in the induced revelation of true marginal costs by bidders. They find that it does not, and demonstrate experimentally that, were the auction mechanism to change to a dynamic auction, lower electricity prices would result.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)96-105
Number of pages10
JournalElectricity Journal
Volume24
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2011
Externally publishedYes

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