TY - JOUR
T1 - Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence
T2 - On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions
AU - Buckenmaier, Johannes
AU - Dimant, Eugen
AU - Posten, Ann Christin
AU - Schmidt, Ulrich
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2021/4
Y1 - 2021/4
N2 - Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism.
AB - Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism.
KW - Deterrence
KW - Institutions
KW - Punishment
KW - Swiftness
KW - Uncertainty
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85111083672&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x
DO - 10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85111083672
SN - 0895-5646
VL - 62
SP - 177
EP - 201
JO - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
JF - Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
IS - 2
ER -