Abstract
Various studies have investigated the precision with which individuals forecast the duration of their affective states that result from events. It is hypothesized that these forecasts rely on lay theories about the progression of affect over time such that lay theories of decreasing affect lead to shorter estimates of the duration of affect than do lay theories of continuing affect. Two studies subtly primed lay theories of progression-one priming theories of affect progression specifically, and the other priming theories of progression more generally-and demonstrated that the accessibility of these lay theories influenced affective forecasts as hypothesized. Study 2 demonstrated that the impact of these lay theories was less pronounced under high elaboration conditions. Results and implications for the inaccuracy of affective forecasts are discussed.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 528-534 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |
Volume | 40 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2004 |
Keywords
- Affective forecasting
- Lay theory
- Social cognition