Skip to main navigation Skip to search Skip to main content

National interest and the falklands war

  • Helen Parr
  • Keele University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Was Britain’s decision to use military action in the 1982 Falklands/ Malvinas War guided by concerns for Britain’s ʼnational interest’? This chapter seeks to answer this question by surveying the events of the crisis and exploring the reasons British policymakers gave for their actions. To recap the conflict in brief, the Argentines invaded East Falkland on 2 April 1982, forced a small group of British Royal Marines to surrender, raised the Argentine flag over Government House and occupied Port Stanley. On 3 April, the House of Commons unequivocally backed the despatch of a task force from Britain. On 26 April, British special forces retook the British Antarctic Survey base at South Georgia. On 2 May, the British submarine HMS Conqueror hit and sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano and an Argentine Exocet missile torpedoed HMS Sheffield on 4 May. British troops landed on East Falkland on 21 May. On 14 June the Argentine forces surrendered and British administration was restored.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationBritish Foreign Policy and the National Interest
Subtitle of host publicationIdentity, Strategy and Security
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan
Pages66-82
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)9781137392350
ISBN (Print)9781137392343
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'National interest and the falklands war'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this