Abstract
Was Britain’s decision to use military action in the 1982 Falklands/ Malvinas War guided by concerns for Britain’s ʼnational interest’? This chapter seeks to answer this question by surveying the events of the crisis and exploring the reasons British policymakers gave for their actions. To recap the conflict in brief, the Argentines invaded East Falkland on 2 April 1982, forced a small group of British Royal Marines to surrender, raised the Argentine flag over Government House and occupied Port Stanley. On 3 April, the House of Commons unequivocally backed the despatch of a task force from Britain. On 26 April, British special forces retook the British Antarctic Survey base at South Georgia. On 2 May, the British submarine HMS Conqueror hit and sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano and an Argentine Exocet missile torpedoed HMS Sheffield on 4 May. British troops landed on East Falkland on 21 May. On 14 June the Argentine forces surrendered and British administration was restored.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | British Foreign Policy and the National Interest |
| Subtitle of host publication | Identity, Strategy and Security |
| Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
| Pages | 66-82 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781137392350 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781137392343 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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