@inproceedings{39c29d27f9ee4f14bcf34b8c0d969f47,
title = "New algorithms for solving single-item reverse auction",
abstract = "This paper deals with the {"}reverse auction{"} problem with an assumption sellers are willing to offer quantity discounts to the buyer. The objective of the buyer is to find such an allocation of quantities that one should buy from each seller, in order to pay as little as possible for the given amount of any product. Two algorithms are presented to solve the introduced problem. The first algorithm is able to find the global optimal solution, although only for some classes of cases. The second algorithm has pseudo-linear complexity and it achieves sub-optimal solutions within predictable range of the optimal one.",
keywords = "Agents, Auction, Heuristic search, Optimization",
author = "Tung, {Dang Thanh} and Baltaz{\'a}r Frankovic and Con Sheahan and Ivana Budinsk{\'a}",
year = "2005",
doi = "10.3182/20050703-6-cz-1902.02257",
language = "English",
isbn = "008045108X",
series = "IFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline)",
publisher = "IFAC Secretariat",
pages = "128--133",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 16th IFAC World Congress, IFAC 2005",
}