New algorithms for solving single-item reverse auction

Dang Thanh Tung, Baltazár Frankovic, Con Sheahan, Ivana Budinská

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

This paper deals with the "reverse auction" problem with an assumption sellers are willing to offer quantity discounts to the buyer. The objective of the buyer is to find such an allocation of quantities that one should buy from each seller, in order to pay as little as possible for the given amount of any product. Two algorithms are presented to solve the introduced problem. The first algorithm is able to find the global optimal solution, although only for some classes of cases. The second algorithm has pseudo-linear complexity and it achieves sub-optimal solutions within predictable range of the optimal one.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 16th IFAC World Congress, IFAC 2005
PublisherIFAC Secretariat
Pages128-133
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)008045108X, 9780080451084
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Publication series

NameIFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline)
Volume16
ISSN (Print)1474-6670

Keywords

  • Agents
  • Auction
  • Heuristic search
  • Optimization

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'New algorithms for solving single-item reverse auction'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this