Abstract
Sizeable employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) have been a unique feature of Ireland's privatization programme. Since the sale in 1999 of the national telecommunications operator, Eircom, the norm has been to allocate 14.9 per cent of equity to employees. We examine the role of the Eircom ESOP in the post-privatization governance of the company. We find that the ESOP sought to maximize returns to employees as shareholders rather than behave in the interests of a wider set of stakeholders. This is explained in terms of the internal governance of the ESOP, namely its structure and rules, as well as the composition and motivations of the board of the ESOP Trustee.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 437-454 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2011 |