TY - JOUR
T1 - The nexus of bicameralism
T2 - Rapporteurs' impact on decision outcomes in the European Union
AU - Costello, Rory
AU - Thomson, Robert
PY - 2011/9
Y1 - 2011/9
N2 - When the chambers of a bicameral legislature must negotiate to reach a decision outcome, the bargaining strength of each side is affected by the composition of its negotiating delegations. We examine some of the implications of this proposition for legislative negotiations between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers. We develop and test hypotheses on how the bargaining success of the EP is affected by the choice of its chief negotiator, the rapporteur. Our findings support the argument that negotiators in a bicameral setting play a 'two-level game', where bargaining strength is shaped by the degree to which negotiators can credibly claim to be constrained by their parent chamber.
AB - When the chambers of a bicameral legislature must negotiate to reach a decision outcome, the bargaining strength of each side is affected by the composition of its negotiating delegations. We examine some of the implications of this proposition for legislative negotiations between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers. We develop and test hypotheses on how the bargaining success of the EP is affected by the choice of its chief negotiator, the rapporteur. Our findings support the argument that negotiators in a bicameral setting play a 'two-level game', where bargaining strength is shaped by the degree to which negotiators can credibly claim to be constrained by their parent chamber.
KW - bicameralism
KW - Council of Ministers
KW - European Parliament
KW - legislative bargaining
KW - rapporteurs
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80053594420&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/1465116511410087
DO - 10.1177/1465116511410087
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:80053594420
SN - 1465-1165
VL - 12
SP - 337
EP - 357
JO - European Union Politics
JF - European Union Politics
IS - 3
ER -