Abstract
Extant research holds that digital sales channels advance competition and service or goods availability but rarely details the attendant information asymmetry. Leveraging a large unique dataset, this study examines a specific case in which consumers have a choice between offline and digital channels for insurance purchases. We find that digital channels screen in consumers with lower unobserved risk. For term life, endowment and disease insurance products, the average risks of the policies purchased through digital channels were significantly lower than those purchased offline after controlling for all observed risk characteristics. This risk screening effect mainly comes from the inclusion of new low-risk enrollees. As a consequence, digital channels exhibit lower information asymmetry and greater profitability compared to offline channels.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 841-866 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Journal of Risk and Insurance |
Volume | 91 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2024 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- digital economy
- information asymmetry
- insurance distribution
- mobile application
- risk screening